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Abstract 
This work is a research that applies the organizational model of the business organization of Corporate 
Governance, to a process of changing in the organizational structure. This Paper defines the various 
organizational solutions and the various levels of complexity that the Corporate Governance structure, through 
its reference context, the load of available information and objectives, must support by choosing the optimal 
organizational solution. Before 2005 Enron under the management of American Government with a logic of 
mass production not very attentive to the different needs of customers. Today the optimal organizational 
solution adopted is the "perfect integration with its distributors" throughout the peninsula, maximizing the 
quality of service to the customer and the knowledge of the various areas of expertise making the company 
more flexible and more competitive. The growing generalized attention (businesses, investors, academic 
circles) towards of the Internal Control system is part of a complex evolutionary process characterized from: 
greater competition / boost to efficiency; emphasis on information transparency; innovative regulatory 
evolution.  
The importance of the theme of Corporate Governance in the world is further increased thanks to the drafting 
of the international Corporate Governance Code for listed companies, which aims to reassure the community 
of international investors on the existence, in listed companies, of an organizational model which provides for 
adequate allocation of responsibilities and powers, and a correct one balance between management and 
control. 
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Introduction 
1. What is Corporate Governance? 
Corporate governance has become a familiar and increasingly popular term in Italy and in the World. With 
the introduction of the 1999 Law on Enterprises, the role of the private sector in economic development and 
job creation in United States began to accelerate. e following decade brought increasingly sophisticated 
domestic production, private enterprise growth and increased global competition. e downside to these 
developments has been the occurrence of major corporate scandals. While various domestic and international 
e companies have made corporate governance a household name, where few Italian companies appear to truly 
appreciate the depth and complexity of this topic. Indeed, corporate governance reforms are introduced 
superficially and used as a public relations exercise, rather than as a tool to introduce the internal structures 
and processes that enable a company to hold the trust of its shareholders, increase the company’s ability to 
access capital and reduce vulnerability to financial crises. But to successfully introduce these structures and 
processes, a company must fully and continually commit to the principles of fairness, transparency, 
accountability and responsibility. This Paper defines corporate governance, makes a business case for its 
implementation, and provides an overview of the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks for corporate 
governance in in Italy and an International Market today. The Purpose of the paper is to define the American 
corporate governance is generically translated into Italian with "corporate governance" referring to companies 
with shares listed on stock exchanges or other regulated markets. It is an elliptical expression to indicate the 
system of rules according to which companies are managed and controlled. It is the result of rules, traditions, 
behaviors developed by the individual economic and juridical systems and is certainly not due to a single 
model, exportable and practicable in all legal systems. All this includes legal provisions, statutory provisions, 
jurisprudential decisions as well as customary principles and business ethics. Not all the rules taken into 
consideration, therefore, are mandatory Alrabba, (Alrabba H. M. 2016). On the contrary, one of the objectives 
of the Italian debate on corporate governance is the delegation with the strengthening of the organizational 
autonomy of the societies and the downsizing of the space traditionally occupied by imperative rules. The 
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corporate governance formula appears to the somewhat vague jurist; but this is precisely the reason for its 
success: it has inspired, in fact, projects for the reform of companies with widespread shareholding, which 
have recently led to the TUF. The news contained in the TUF regarding the protection of minority 
shareholders; reform of the powers of the board of statutory auditors and of the regulations of the shareholders' 
meeting; transparency of ownership structures in companies listed on the stock exchange or appealing to 
public savings, are directly inspired, in fact, to the principles of corporate governance developed in 
international practice. The structure of the corporate bodies, understood in its broader meaning and including 
the powers, functions, obligations and responsibilities of the members of the bodies is the central element of 
the debate. Rules of corporate governance are contained in the Corporate Governance Code prepared in 1999 
by the Corporate Governance Committee of listed companies according to the best practice of the other 
European Union countries and of the US financial markets. It contains rules concerning the board of directors; 
chairman of the board of directors; board of statutory auditors; relationships between shareholders, especially 
among controlling shareholders and institutional investors. It also proposes the establishment of a series of 
committees whose task is to deal respectively with proposals for the appointment of the members of the board 
of directors and the remuneration of the members of the board; to perform an internal control function on the 
correct functioning of the corporate body (see also: Report on Corporate Governance (Indonesia Corporate 
Governance Manual-2014)). 
2. Globalization, Global financial crisis of 2008-09 and Europe’s Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2010. We are 
living in a highly “globalized and integrated world economy”, continued liberalization of international trade 
is certain to further internationalize consumption patterns around the world and consumption, production of 
good and services has become highly globalized. To a Large extent, this has happened as a result of 
Multinational Financial Corporations’ (MFNCs) relentless efforts to source inputs and locate production 
anywhere in the world where costs are lower and profits are higher. Recently, financial markets have also 
become highly integrated. This development allows investors to diversify their investment portfolios 
internationally. In 2009, for instance, U.S. investors collectively invested $549 billion in foreign securities, 
such a stocks and bonds whereas foreigners invested $377 billion n U.S. securities. Undoubtedly, we are now 
living in a word were all the major economic functions-consumption, production and investment are highly 
globalized. Although, the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States that began in the summer 2007 led to 
a severe credit crunch, making borrowing and refinancing difficult for households, firms and banks. The credit 
crunch, in turn, escalated to a full- blown global financial crisis in 2008-2009. The defending moment of the 
crisis came on September 14, 2008, when Lehman Brothers, a major U.S. investment bank, with a global 
presence, went bankrupt. The abrupt failure of an iconic U.S. bank touched off a major crisis of confidence in 
financial markets and institutions around the world. The crisis engulfed not only advanced economies, such 
as United States, Japan and the European Union but also many emerging economies, including Brazil, China 
and Russia. The world was sliding into the “Great Recession”, the most serious, synchronized economic 
downturn since the Great Depression. Recently, however the euro’s emergence as a global currency was death 
a serious set - back in the midst of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis. The crisis started in December 2009 when 
the New Greek government revealed hat its budget deficit for the year would be 12.7 percent of the GDP, not 
the 3.7 percent previously forecast. The previous government had falsified the national account data. 
Unbeknownst to the outside the world, Greece was in a serious violation of Europe’s stability pact, which 
limits the annual budget deficit of a euro-zone country to a maximum of 3 percent of GDP. This news surprised 
financial markets and prompted investors, who became worried about sovereign default, to sell off Greek 
government bonds. The sovereign debt crisis in Greece, which accounts for only about 2.5 percent of euro-
zone GDP, quickly escalated to a Europe-wide debt crisis, threatening the nascent recovery of the world 
economy from the severe global financial crisis of 2008-2009. The financial crisis of subprime mortgages 
began in the United States in 2006. The assumptions of the crisis date back to 2003, when it began to 
significantly increase the disbursement of high-risk mortgages, ie to customers who would not have obtained 
credit under normal conditions. since they would not have been able to provide sufficient guarantees. The 
factors that have stimulated the growth of subprime mortgages are attributable, inter alia, to the dynamics of 
the US real estate market and the development of securitization (Velte, P., & Eulerich, M. (2014)).  
From 2000 until mid-2006, house prices in the United States have grown steadily and significantly, generating 
a real housing bubble. This dynamic was favored by the accommodating monetary policy of the Federal 
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Reserve (FED), which maintained interest rates on historically low values until 2004, in response to the 
internet bubble crisis and the September 11, 2001 attack. 
Monetary policy. Low interest rates amounted to a low cost of money for borrowers of funds, ie for 
households that required mortgage loans, and therefore ended up stimulating the demand for housing, further 
fueling their prices. Furthermore, the real estate bubble made it convenient for mortgages to be granted by 
financial institutions which, in the event of insolvency of the borrower, could in any case recover the money 
lent through the attachment and resale of the home. 
Securitization. In addition to the housing bubble and low interest rates, the growth of subprime mortgages 
was also supported by the development of securitization transactions, ie the possibility for banks to transfer 
mortgages, after having 'transformed' them into a security, to subjects third parties (the so-called 'vehicle 
companies') and to immediately recover a large part of the credit that would otherwise have been collected 
only at the end of the loans themselves (10, 20 or 30 years later). The securitization allowed the banks, 
apparently, to get rid of the risk of insolvency of the borrowers of the funds and thus weakened the incentive 
to correctly assess the reliability of the customers. The vehicle companies, for their part, financed the purchase 
of securitized loans by offering short-term securities to investors. 
The special purpose vehicle (SPV) and conduit companies included medium and long-term loans sold by 
banks and short-term securities (the so-called Asset backed commercial paper - ABCP), guaranteed by the 
transferred banking assets and assisted by lines of liquidity made available by the banks themselves. An 
alternative form of securitization envisaged the issuance of the so-called Collateralised Debt Obligations 
(CDO) again through special vehicle companies (often also designated under the name CDO) and re-
securitization operations, in which the underlying assets were mainly structured securities (El Nashar, T. 
(2016)). 
In a context of low interest rates, securitized securities have been subscribed by many investors both in the 
US and in Europe. This circumstance has created the conditions for the transmission of the crisis from the US 
economy to the European economies Krauß, P., & Zülch, H. (2013).  
The expansion of leverage. The development of the securitizations has led to the transition of the banking 
business model from the original approach and hold (the bank pays the loan and waits a period of time before 
recovering the sum lent and related interests) to the approach originated and distribute (the bank issues the 
loan and transfers it to third parties through securitization, immediately recovering the sum loaned). As a 
result of the securitization, the banks quickly fell in the availability of the money lent, which could be reused 
to provide other loans to customers whose reliability was evaluated in an increasingly less accurate. Thanks 
to the securitization, financial institutions could greatly expand their assets in relation to their capital (a 
phenomenon of leverage or financial leverage). This allowed them to make very high profits, but also exposed 
them to the risk of huge losses  (Velte, P., & Eulerich, M. (2014).  
The role of rating agencies. The securitization transactions generated very complex structured products, not 
standardized and not very liquid. In addition, structured products were traded mainly over the counter (OTC), 
ie outside regulated markets, and in the absence of significant prices, ie prices that could be used for their 
assessment shared by market participants. In this context, given the opacity of products and the difficulty of 
appreciating their value, the rating agencies' judgment has assumed increasing importance as a shared 
reference for the evaluation Velte, P. & Stiglbauer, M. (2012).  
3. First Part: International Financial Markets Risks and the necessity for a Reregulation. To day we 
may be convinced of the importance the main risks of the Financial Market that they can be defined in “Foreign 
exchange and political risks”, “Market Imperfections”, and “Expanded opportunity set”. As well we see, these 
major dimensions of international finance largely stem from the fact that sovereign nations have the right and 
power to re-regulate in terms of issue currencies, formulate their own economic policies, impose taxes, and 
regulate movements of people, goods, and across their borders. When firms and individuals are engaged in 
cross border transactions, they are potentially exposed to Foreign Exchange Risk that they would normally 
encounter in purely domestic transactions. Currently the exchange rates among such major currencies as the 
U.S. Dollar, Japanese Yen, British Pound, and Euro fluctuate continuously in an “unpredictable manner”. 
This has been the case since the early 1970s, when fixed exchange rates were abandoned. Exchange rate 
uncertainty will have a pervasive influence on all the major economic functions, including consumption, 
production, and investment. Another risk that firms and individuals may encounter in international setting is 
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Political Risk. Political Risk ranges from unexpected changes in tax rules to outright expropriation of assets 
held by foreigners. Political risks arise from the fact that a sovereign country can change the “rules of the 
game” and the affected parties may not have effective recourse (Feten, A., & Salma, D.-A. (2015). In 1992, 
the Enron Development Corporation, a subsidiary of a Huston-based energy company, signed a contract to 
build India’s largest plant. After Enron has spent nearly $300 million, the project was canceled in 1995 by 
nationalist politicians in the Maharashtra state who argued India did not need the power plant. The Enron 
episode presents the difficulty of enforcing contracts regulation in foreign countries. Multinational firms and 
Investors should be particularly aware of political risk when they invest in those countries without a tradition 
of the rule of law and It is important to understand that the property rights of shareholders and investor are 
not universally respected and the consequent necessity of a international reregulation. Although the world 
economy is much more integrated today than was the case of 20 years ago, a variety of barriers still hamper 
free movements of people, goods, and services, and capital across national boundaries. These barriers include 
legal restrictions, excessive transaction and transportations costs, information asymmetry, and discriminatory 
taxation. The world markets are thus highly imperfect. Market Imperfections, which represent various 
frictions and impediments preventing markets from functioning perfectly, play an important role in motivating 
MFNCs to locate production overseas. Honda, a Japanese automobile company, for instance, decided to 
establish production facilities in the United States, mainly to circumvent trade barriers. One might even say 
that MFNCs are a gift of market imperfections. Imperfections in the world financial markets tend to restrict 
the extent to which investors can diversify their portfolios. An interesting example is provided by Nestle’ 
Corporation, a well-know Swiss MNC. Nestle’ used to issue two different classes of common stock, bearer 
shares and registered shares, and foreigners were allowed to hold only bearer shares. Additionally when firms 
venture into the arena of global markets, they can benefit from an Expanded Opportunity Set, firms can 
locate production in any country or region of the world to maximize their performance and raise funds in any 
capital market where the cost of capital is the lowest. In addition, firms can gain from greater economies of 
scale when their tangible and intangible assets are deployed in a global basis. A real world example showing 
the gains from a global approach to financial management is provided by the following excerpt from The Wall 
Street Journal (April 9, 1996): “Another factor binding bond markets ever closer is large companies flexibility 
to issue bonds around the word at will, thanks to the global swap market. At the vanguard are companies such 
as General Electric of the U.S. Mark VanderGried, who runs the financing desk at Banque Paribas, says it 
took about 15 minutes a four billion franc ($791.6 million) deal for GE. By rising the money in francs and 
swapping into the dollars instantly, GE will save five hundredths of percentage point or about $400,000 
annually on the nine-year deal”. Individual investors can benefit greatly if they invest internationally rather 
than domestically this increase the probability of Moral Hazard with the consequence of a necessary Re-
regulation to day in the financial Market (Jacqueline L. Doyle, J. Colley, and W. Stettinius 2013).  
4 The Reregulation and the Reorganization of the International Financial Management. The effective 
Reregulation of the International Financial Management, however is more than the application of the newest 
business and financial techniques or operating more efficiently (Ferri Di Fabrizio, L. (2017). There must be 
that the fundamental goal of the Financial Management to day is shareholder wealth maximization reducing 
the probability of a future financial crisis. Shareholders Wealth Maximization means that the firms makes 
all business decisions and investments with an eye toward making the owners of the firm – the shareholders 
– better off financially, or more wealthy, than they were before. Whereas shareholder wealth maximization is 
generally accepted as the ultimate goal of financial management in “Anglo-Saxon” countries, such as 
Australia, Canada the United Kingdom, and especially the United States, it is not widely as widely embraced 
a goal in the other parts of the world. In countries like France, Italy and Germany, for example shareholders 
are generally viewed as one of the “Stakeholders of the firms”, others being employees, customers and 
supplies, banks and so forth (Murase, H., Numata, S., & Takeda, F. (2013)). European Managers tend to 
consider the promotion of the firm’s stakeholders overall welfare as the most important corporate goal. In 
Japan, on the other hand, many companies form a small number of interlocking business groups called 
Keiretsu, such as Mitsubishi which arose from consolidation of family-owned business empires. It is pointed 
out, however, that has capital markets are becoming liberalized and internationally integrated in recent years, 
even managers in recent years in Italy, France, Japan and Germany and other non-Aglo Saxon countries with 
this kind of reregulation are beginning to pay serious attention to shareholder wealth maximization. 
Obviously, the financial firm could pursue other goal. This not means, however, that the goal of shareholder 
wealth maximization is merely an alternative. If the financial firm seeks to maximize shareholder wealth, it 
will most likely simultaneously be accomplishing other legitimate goals that are perceived worldwide. 
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Shareholder wealth maximization is a long-run goal (Minow N., Robert A.,(2015). A firm cannot stay in a 
business to maximize shareholder wealth if it threats employees poorly, produces shoddy merchandise, wastes 
raw materials and natural resources, operates inefficiently, or fails to satisfy customers. Only a well-managed 
business firm that profitably produces what is demanded in a efficient manner can expect to stay in business 
in the long run and thereby provide employment opportunities this only if the firm or financial company 
provides a huge supervision over its operation detecting risks, that we have previously mentioned, and taking 
appropriate actions. While managers are hired to run the financial company for the interest of the 
shareholders, there is no guarantee that they will actually do so. As shown by a series of recent corporate 
scandals at companies like Enron, WordCom, and Global Crossing where managers may pursue their own 
interest at the expense of the shareholders when they are not closely monitored. This so-called Agency 
Problem is a major weakness of the public corporation. Using an evident amount of resources addressed by 
companies for supervision the possibility of malfeasance and accounting manipulations at these companies 
decreases avoiding financial distress and bankruptcy and preventing devastation of shareholders and 
employees. Some senior managers are monitored and controlled by the possibility to enriched themselves 
enormously in the process. Clearly, the board of directors has to perform his duty inside of the financial 
company (Habbash, M. (2012). In presence of these enforcements of corporate regulations the credibility in 
the free market system increases. After these scandals the society has painfully learned the importance of 
corporate governance, that is, the new financial and legal framework for regulating the relationship between 
company’s management and its shareholders. This policy not only have a positive effect inside of United 
States and Europe but also in the emerging economies as Indonesia, Korea, China, and Russia where the legal 
protection of shareholders is weak or virtually non-existent (Kandemir, H. K. (2016)). The Reconstruction of 
the organization of the financial firms is necessary where the Corporate Governance structure varies greatly 
across countries, reflecting different cultural, legal, economic, and political environment in different countries. 
Precisely in the countries where the shareholders do not have strong legal rights, and corporate ownership 
tends to be concentrated, the ownership may give rise to the conflicts of interest between dominant 
shareholders (often the founding family) and small outside shareholders. The collapse of Parmalat, a family-
controlled Italian company, after decade of accounting frauds, provides an introduction of a reregulation of 
the organizational structure preventing ex-ante moral hazards and distortionary incentives from the owners 
and ex-post reducing tax in case of failure. “The Government has to be present regulating giving a strong 
sense of state, public and social services. The owner families are less incentives to operate through moral 
hazard in presence of efficient institutions”. A new regulation based on Shareholders as owner of the business, 
it is their capital that is at risk. It is only equitable that they receive a fair returns on their investment (Eun, 
Resnick and Sabherwal, 2004).  
Conclusions: Economic Consequence, Costs and Benefits of the Reregulation of the Financial Sector. 
The Macro and Micro effects of the Reregulation and Reorganization of the Financial Sector, that we resume 
in “Regulation for the Supervision of the Financial Firms and Markets more efficient”, “Allocation of 
Resources for putting Supervisors in a position to detect better the Risks of the International Financial Market” 
and “Reorganization of the Financial Firms for prevent Moral Hazard and Agency Problems’ behaviors by 
the Owners”, are different and heterogeneous (Wilkinson, N., & Coetzee, P. (2015). Primary, the Regulation 
for the Supervision has economic consequences defined in major control of the Financial activities to the 
services of the shareholders with the object of the Shareholders Wealth Maximization, more transparency, 
and guarantee of shareholder’s rights. The costs for the Central Banks as European Central Bank and Federal 
Reserve is to reduce their direct control to the Financial firms delegating the power to the Supervisors. 
Consequently, the reduction of the services offered by the banks and others intermediaries with the aims to 
avoid the development of the Moral Hazard’ behavior by the Owners, the reduction of the organizational 
profit, and the reduction of the probability of a future financial crisis with e estimated loss grater than the loss 
of the previous financial crisis estimated in $15 Trillions are benefits (Ledimo, O., & Martins, N. (2014)). 
Secondly, the Macroeconomic impact on credit supply and the economic growth of the Allocation of 
Resources for Supervisors is defined in a efficient allocation of the resources available, loss minimization and 
the reduction of the illicit appropriation of the firm’s revenues. This has the effect on a increment of the 
amount of money putted in the international financial market as monetary policy or the Keynes effect, 
necessary for improve the acceleration the economy process (Krauß, P., & Zülch, H. (2013)). Other benefits 
can be major revenues of firms in a well-managed business in a long run goal with a major customer loyalty. 
In particular, the costs are less profits of the firms in presence of a huge amount of resources allocated to 
supervisions and the possibility of arbitrage between countries and types of financial firms for non - 
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controlling financial activities and permitting illegal and Moral Hazard actions to operate. Third, the 
Reorganization of the Financial Firms it involves at last the economics consequences of the reduction of 
Agency Problems, as previously defined, in the Financial Firms with a concentrated ownership (Italian family 
financial company) and major dynamicity of the Multinational Financial Companies that operate in different 
heterogeneous countries preventing the Financial Market Risks (Foreign exchange and political risks, Market 
Imperfections, and Expanded opportunity Set). The relevant effect on the size of the financial sector, on profits 
and salaries to be expected in the future are a major protection and extension of the rights for shareholders 
respecting the ownership that owns a major share concentration (R. I. Tricker 2017). 
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